The Upper Register Blog

As a fellow adherent of the “two kingdom” theory, I applaud a good deal of what Scott Clark is trying to say here. I agree with him that there is such a thing as natural law inscribed on the conscience and that it is binding on all men in all ages. But I disagree with these statements:

It is the creational (and biblical) office of the magistrate to assert and protect creational/natural boundaries by promoting civil peace and justice … It is the creational function of the state to preserve order and require humans to live within their creational boundaries … The magistrate has a right and a duty to enforce marriage and divorce laws in order to enforce natural, creational boundaries in the same way he has a duty to protect a society from theft and fraud.

Note that, on Clark’s view, the civil magistrate is obligated to “assert,” “protect,” and “enforce” natural law, to “require humans to live within their creational boundaries.” Clark makes this claim in order to argue that the state has a moral duty to recognize only heterosexual marriage. Clark seems to be saying that the state has a moral obligation or duty to enforce the moral law (= natural law), a duty that itself derives from moral/natural law.

My problem with this is that, if logically carried through, this will lead to a view of civil government that is just as theocratic as that desired by the theonomists. The only difference so far as I can tell is that on Clark’s view there would be more leeway in the specifics of the penal code. But consider the following implications. The state would be obligated to …

- Prohibit public expressions of idolatry
- Have blue laws encouraging Sabbath observance
- Criminalize all forms of immoral sexual activity between consenting adults, including homosexual activity
- Prohibit all unlawful divorce
- Prevent those who were divorced unlawfully from remarrying

Now Clark protests that he is no theocrat:

To anticipate an objection, this is not a theocratic argument. It is not the magistrate’s duty to police every sort of violation of natural law and sin. For example, no one but theocrats want the state enforcing obedience to the first table of the law. The magistrate’s natural sphere of concern and authority is in the second table.

But if he really believes that “it is not the magistrate’s duty to police every sort of violation of natural law,” including all violations of the first table, then he is going back on his original premise: he no longer believes that the civil magistrate is obligated to enforce moral/natural law per se, but only a subset of it. But if he actually thinks the civil magistrate only has a duty to enforce a subset of the moral/natural law, how can he claim that the civil magistrate has a moral duty to enforce any of it? After all, the moral duty of the civil magistrate to enforce the moral/natural law flows from the moral law itself. So how can the magistrate pick and choose the parts he is going to enforce, when the whole stands or falls together? So, in spite of Clark’s claim that “this is not a theocratic argument,” it is, in fact, a theocratic argument.

Since he has appealed to natural law as the foundational principle of his theory of civil government, he is caught on the horns of a dilemma. Either he maintains his foundational principle (namely, that the civil magistrate has a moral obligation to enforce the moral law) and applies it consistently to the civil enforcement of the entire moral law, both the so-called first and the second table. Or he backs down and makes a much less dramatic claim: the civil magistrate may enforce parts of the moral law to the extent that it promotes good order and well-being in society. But then Clark would no longer be able to claim that the civil magistrate is morally required to enforce the creational boundaries concerning marriage. The civil magistrate could still enforce the creational boundaries concerning marriage, but now only on the softer ground that various sociological studies have shown that it is better for society, for children, etc., not because natural law requires it.

Another problem with the appeal to natural law as the principle for determining the positive enforcement duties of the civil magistrate is that we live in a pluralistic society in which the very content of natural law itself is highly contested at critical points. Many citizens believe, for example, that committed same-sex relationships are not in any way sinful. Again, I affirm that the these people are wrong, and that deep down they know they are wrong. I know that because I believe the Bible’s teaching concerning the content of natural law (e.g., Romans 1). But such an appeal to Scripture will have minimal persuasive value in the public square. A natural law theorist may not go out with the intention of making a naked appeal to Scripture. He may try appealing to various arguments that support his interpretation of natural law, keeping his biblical beliefs out of play to achieve maximum rhetorical effect. But since the ultimate epistemic basis for his interpretation of natural law is Scripture, at the end of the day this will come to light at some point in the argument and it will become evident that he is not really making a good-faith religiously-neutral appeal.

The irony is that Clark claims to be an advocate of the “two kingdom” theory of civil government, that is, the notion that the two kingdoms — the common grace kingdom of civil government and the eschatological kingdom of God — are separate and distinct. Yet in his version, the common grace kingdom of civil government is bound to enforce the moral/natural law. In this way, the civil realm loses its common grace character and becomes theocratic, thus erasing the distinction between the two kingdoms.

Most theonomists would be perfectly happy with a state run on natural law principles, since they argue that the general equity of the Mosaic Law is identical with natural/moral law as revealed via general revelation (cp. Bahnsen, No Other Standard, pp. 206, 222).

Again, I agree with the Reformed doctrine of natural law. It is biblical (Romans 1). I’m merely objecting to the claim that it is the moral duty of the state to enforce it in society.

Here.

The epistle to the Hebrews has the most elegant Greek style of any NT book. There are a thousand little pleasures to be enjoyed for those reading it in Greek that are otherwise inaccessible to those reading in translation.  For example, it is impossible for a translation to capture the alliteration of the opening words - polymeros kai polytropos palai (note the four p’s). Then there is the beautiful period (a paragraph-long Greek sentence) that comprises 1:1-4, surpassed in the NT only by Luke’s opening paragraph in his Gospel.

Hebrews also employs numerous stylistic devices, e.g., complex word orders such as hyperbaton (e.g., 1:4) and various rhyming devices (e.g., 5:8; 13:14), that demonstrate unparalleled command of the Greek language (by NT standards). In many cases, these devices, while impressive, do not come across as bombastic rhetorical flourishes as one might find in the florid Asiatic style, but are calculated to convey a certain emotional impression that reinforces the theological or parenetic point at hand.

My personal favorite (at the moment) is the men … de construction of 10:11-12, particularly the houtos de mian … (which places the emphasis on the word “one”):

Day after day every priest stands and performs his religious duties; again and again he offers the same sacrifices, which can never take away sins. But when this priest had offered for all time one sacrifice for sins, he sat down at the right hand of God. (NASB)

Anyway, do give the Greek text of Hebrews a taste some day. It is well worth it.

Answered here.

Many Bible-believing Christians believe it would be a sin to vote for Obama because of his strong pro-choice position. “Don’t bloody your hands by casting a vote for Obama” they cry. Even noted Christian philosophers argue that to vote for Obama would be to engage in “material cooperation” with mass murder. I don’t think I need to post more links to prove that this overwrought rhetoric is rife on the web. 

I understand the strong biblical convictions that lie behind this way of thinking. I fully sympathize with the passion for justice that animates this concern. I am pro-life and view abortion as a grave moral evil.

However, I just hope that those of you who think voting for Obama is a sin are consistent. I trust that you will have the courage of your convictions and do the following:

(1) You will not vote for John McCain, since he (a) supports federal funding for embryonic stem cell research, which would kill just as many millions, and (b) is opposed to a federal ban on abortion (he thinks the states should be allowed to decide).

(2) In future elections, you will not vote for any candidate who has adopted a stance similar to McCain’s.

(3) In the still farther future - who knows, 20, 30, 40 years from now? - when the Supreme Court concludes that stare decisis means that Roe v. Wade is settled law and no longer open for re-consideration, and there is no viable political party that seriously intends to implement a federal ban on abortions, you will withdraw from electoral politics and stop voting altogether.

(4) You will seriously ponder the arguments in favor of lawful killing in defense of the innocent and explain to the rest of us why you find those arguments to be morally repugnant. I am not accusing you of holding this extreme position either explicitly or implicitly, but in view of your overwrought rhetoric, you have an obligation to give us a more cogent explanation for why your rhetoric does not, should not, and cannot lead to such a violent conclusion. It won’t do to merely claim that you disagree with it.

(5) You will advocate that members of your churches who voted for either Obama or McCain be subjected to church discipline for “material cooperation with evil.”

Even if McCain is elected, he would probably not be able to get justices on the Supreme Court who are prepared to overturn Roe v. Wade. He may be able to get a few more moderate conservative justices like Roberts and Alito, but not extremists like Scalia. In a best case scenario, if he does succeed in getting a few more Scalias on the court, and Roe is overturned, McCain has said he is opposed to a federal ban on abortion and merely wants to “de-federalize” the issue, i.e., to allow each state to decide. Add to that his stance on embryonic stem cell research, and “the mass murder of millions of innocent human beings” will continue under a McCain administration!

So, you who believe that those who vote for Obama are getting blood on their hands, can you explain to us why your vote for McCain leaves you morally pristine?

As Christians we all have to live and vote in the real world and that involves making pragmatic decisions that don’t always align perfectly with our theoretical ideals. None of us can cast a morally pure vote. We vote for the candidate we think is best suited to lead our country at this particular junction in history and to deal with the issues that seem to us to have the greatest moment. Perhaps you think abortion is the number one problem facing our country right now. I think you’re wrong, and we can agree to disagree on that. But unless you have the courage of your convictions and are willing to be consistent, then I would respectfully request that you tone down the rhetoric a tad.

Thanks.

I preached a sermon by that title on October 12. You can get the MP3 here.

My thesis was that we do not confess our sins in order to be forgiven, but to have the once-for-all work of Christ applied afresh to our hearts and consciences, thus restoring our assurance and fellowship with God.

It may sound a bit unconventional to say that we do not confess our sins in order to be forgiven, but if we believe in the the doctrines of (a) propitiation (1 John 2:2), (b) justification (Rom 5:1), and (c) union with Christ (Eph 1:4-6), then it follows that all our sins - past, present, and future - are already forgiven in Christ, even before we confess them. Our objective judicial status does not change when we sin. Thus confession of sin must have to do with our subjective relationship and sense of fellowship with God.

The text was 1 John 1:5-2:2, especially verse 7:  “If we walk in the Light as He Himself is in the Light, we have fellowship with one another, and the blood of Jesus His Son cleanses us from all sin.” I argued that ”one another” does not refer to fellowship among believers, but fellowship with God (cp. verse 3:  “… and indeed our fellowship is with the Father, and with His Son Jesus Christ”).

In addition to dealing with the why of confessing our sins, I also gave seven practical applications on the how of confessing our sins.

I am convinced that the two-source hypothesis explaining the origins of the synoptic Gospels is basically correct. The two-source hypothesis is that Matthew and Luke independently relied on two sources, Mark and Q (= all the material common to Matthew and Luke but not found in Mark), which, together with additional material, they reworked to fashion their own theological narratives of the life, ministry, death and resurrection of Jesus. 

But there are different ways of conceiving of Q. Some scholars think of Q merely as oral tradition. Others think it was a written document, merely an ad hoc collection of some of the sayings and deeds of Jesus, perhaps akin to the logia that Papias attributed to Matthew, but not a Gospel. And still others think Q was the earliest Gospel. I’m not certain whether it was oral or written. But I  am sure it was not the earliest Gospel. Why? Because Q does not contain the passion narrative, and so by definition it would not have been a Gospel.

But some radical scholars think otherwise - for example, John S. Kloppenborg, in his recent book Q, the Earliest Gospel: An Introduction to the Original Stories and Sayings of Jesus (WJK, 2008). I haven’t read the whole book but in the WJK Academic Update 3:1 (2008-2009) the book is excerpted. Here is a shocking selection from chapter 3:

The reconstruction of Q results in a document, probably composed in the Galilee, and consisting of about 4,500 words of text - a document about the size of Paul’s second letter to the Corinthians. But why should anyone be interested in this document, except source critics who study the ways in which Matthew and Luke composed their Gospels? …

The importance of Q lies not in any new material but rather in the distinctive manner in which it frames and presents its sayings and stories. Q is also distinctive for what it lacks …

Q is an unseen force behind the composition of Matthew and Luke. If it existed, we will have to think differently about how the earliest followers of Jesus began to enact “the kingdom of God” and about how they thought about the significance of Jesus. Why? It is because Q represents a different type of gospel from the canonical Gospels of Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John and different again from the gospel preached by Paul …

For example, the complete lack of reference to the saving acts of Jesus in the letter of James and the absence of any reference to the cross and resurrection have struck commentators as peculiar. But if Q also lacks any explicit reference to Jesus’ crucifixion, focusing instead on his teachings, then James’ silences about Jesus’ death and resurrection may not be so singular. Conversely, features of early Christian literature that seemed expected, virtually inevitable - for example, that every account of Jesus’ significance would necessarily include his baptism and end with the crucifixion and resurrection - will now seem less self-evident, for Q lacks any explicit description of Jesus’ death. The fact that an account of Jesus’ death is not an inevitable part of a gospel helps us appreciate even more the literary and theological achievement of Mark, who created an account of Jesus’ death and gave it theological intelligibility.

Kloppenborg’s desire to uncover an early, alternative Jesus-anity in which the atonement is lacking is sharply rebuked by the facts. For the earliest outlines of the apostolic proclamation of Jesus focus precisely on Jesus’ atoning death and resurrection for the forgiveness of sins (e.g., 1 Cor 15:1-11; Acts 10:34-43). 

In any event, the desire to interpret Q not merely as an ad hoc collection (whether oral or written) of some of the sayings and deeds of Jesus but as the earliest Gospel is a dangerous departure from the apostolic preaching of the significance of Jesus the Messiah. 

Seyoon Kim has informed me that his new book was released on October 8 and that he just received his author’s copies. As soon as I can get a hold of a copy I’ll read it and review it here.

Here’s the description on the Eerdmans site:

The slogan “Paul and the Empire” is much in vogue in New Testament scholarship today. But did Paul truly formulate his gospel in antithesis to the Roman imperial cult and ideology and seek to subvert the Empire? In Christ and Caesar Seyoon Kim first examines five epistles of Paul exegetically and shows how the dominant anti-imperial interpretation is actually difficult to sustain.

Next he examines the Lukan writings (Luke-Acts) to see how Luke talks about the encounters of Paul and other gospel preachers with Roman imperialism. Kim explores why it is that Luke makes no effort to present Christ’s redemption as materialized in terms of political liberation. Finally, Kim compares the exaltation Christologies of Luke, Revelation, Paul, and Hebrews and inquires about the hermeneutical possibility of developing a political Christology in our present-day context.

If my previous post piqued your interest in studying the LXX, here are some good resources to get you started. The LXX (or Greek Bible) is an exciting field that is burgeoning these days, so there are a lot of great resources.

First and foremost, read and digest Jobes & Silva, Invitation to the Septuagint (Baker, 2000). Several other introductory books on the LXX have recently become available (e.g., Jennifer Dines, Natalio Fernandez Marcos, Martin Hengel), but this one is the best by far. Sidney Jellicoe is actually pretty good too, but it was originally published in 1968 and therefore is not as up-to-date as Jobes & Silva.

If you want to dig in and start reading the LXX, you’ll definitely need a Greek-English lexicon. There are two to choose from:

Lust, Eynikel, and Hauspie (=LEH) (Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 2003)
T. Muraoka (Peeters, 2002)

They’re both good. I have used LEH extensively and found it to be fine. However, they give brief glosses, whereas Muraoka’s entries are more expansive. Also, Muraoka’s philosophy is slightly different from LEH’s. Muraoka defines words based on what a Greek reader with no knowledge of Hebrew would have thought, based on usage in context, whereas LEH defines words with reference to the underlying Hebrew, thus placing the emphasis on the intent of the LXX translators. Both approaches have their place. One drawback of Muraoka is that it is a lexicon “Chiefly of the Pentateuch and the 12 Prophets.”

For grammar, see Conybeare & Stock’s Grammar of Septuagint Greek. It’s old but excellent, and continues to be republished in various forms. It also has some selected readings from the LXX with notes. If you need help with parsing, get Bernard Taylor’s Analytical Lexicon to the Septuagint (Zondervan, 1994). Also indispensable is the concordance by Hatch & Redpath.

You also must get the New English Translation of the Septuagint (=NETS) (Oxford, 2007). Not only is it necessary to have a good English translation, but this volume is also a good intro to the LXX since it has extensive introductions to each book. See my blog review. As I say in my post, I also continue to find the old 19th century translation by Sir Lancelot C. L. Brenton useful, particularly the edition with the Greek and English in double columns for ease of use (Hendrickson and Zondervan have both printed it in the past). Note also that Rahlfs was reprinted in 2006 with minor corrections by Robert Hanhart.  

Finally, check out these excellent scholarly resources online:

http://www.kalvesmaki.com/LXX/

http://ccat.sas.upenn.edu/ioscs/

http://ccat.sas.upenn.edu/nets/

Mogens Müller, The First Bible of the Church: A Plea for the Septuagint (JSOTSupp 206; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1996).

Historically … the Septuagint should be endowed with special significance considered as a translation, because, to some circles of Greek-speaking Jewry, it replaced the Biblia Hebraica, and thus became their Bible. Because it was accepted as conclusive evidence of the biblical revelations, it was used by the authors of the New Testament writings, and, accordingly, came to have a decisive impact on the theology of the New Testament. In a historical perspective, it became, to an even greater extent than the Biblia Hebraica, the Old Testament of the New Testament. [pp. 115-16]

It is fundamentally important to able to ascertain that the Old Testament testimony of revelation has preserved its integrity in the Greek translation. The Greek formal demands have been disregarded in places where they would have disturbed the essence and content of the original testimony. In other words, the translation did not bow to the Greek spirit …. It is of the utmost importance to establish that the Septuagint has retained its Jewish basis in spite of the circumstances where interpretation has had to walk a tightrope between an acceptable Hellenization and an unacceptable assimilation to Hellenism, and that distance in time and another milieu promoted a certain degree of independence. The Septuagint cannot be bypassed if we want to conjure the Judaism from which Christianity grew. [p. 117, emphasis mine]

Until the process began which insisted on monopolizing Hebraica Veritas as the only authentic Bible text in respect of the Old Testament, the Jewish Bible was in fact both the Hebrew and the Greek text. Added to this, the biblical theological context makes it abundantly clear that the textual form of the Septuagint was the most popular in the New Testament. Where the shape of the Jewish Bible is concerned, a one-sided preference for the Hebrew-Aramaic text as the original par excellence in those decades when the New Testament books were written should be precluded …. In a biblical theological context the Septuagint does in fact convey, more convincingly than the Biblia Hebraica, what the New Testament authors understood as their Holy Writ. [pp. 120-21]

The Septuagint has largely replaced Biblia Hebraica in the New Testament. For the New Testament authors this translation had tremendous impact. It influenced their perception of the wording of the Bible text decisively, and, to a varying degree, left its stamp on their language. [p. 129]

What about the Apocrypha? Müller argues that “the Septuagint’s part in the Christian reception of the Old Testament did not imply the inclusion of the Old Testament Apocrypha in line with the books contained in the Biblia Hebraica” [p. 121].  The Apocrypha were, for the most part, composed in Greek, and as such are witnesses to the Greek-speaking Judaism that created the Greek translation of the canonical books.

Müller probably goes too far when, in his concluding plea for the LXX, he suggests that the Christian Church should throw out the Hebrew Bible, so that the Bible of the church would be composed of the LXX + NT. A better formulation is that the Christian Old Testament must use both the Hebrew and the Greek (LXX) text as witnesses (similar to Müller’s line, quoted above, that the Jewish Bible was both the Hebrew and the Greek text, p. 120). Interestingly, if one uses Biblia Hebraica Stuttgartensia (BHS), for example, the text-critical footnotes are regularly sprinkled with references to the LXX. And as Emanuel Tov has shown, the LXX is one of the oldest witnesses to the original Hebrew text (see his The Text-Critical Use of the Septuagint in Biblical Research [2nd ed.; Simor, 1997]) long predating the textual developments that occurred after the destruction of the Jerusalem and the establishment of Rabbinic Judaism.

The key issue here is that textual criticism of the OT is directly relevant to biblical theology. How can we even begin to find the proper connection and relationship between the NT and the OT if we start by using the wrong textual basis for the OT (the Masoretic text, which has roots in the pre-Rabbinic period but which, in its final form, developed after the NT was written)? Should we not attempt, as far as we are able, to use the OT that the NT writers used? This is admittedly difficult, since the LXX that we now have printed in Rahlfs, for example, is based primarily on fourth/fifth century ecclesiastical manuscripts such as Vaticanus (B), Sinaiticus (S), and Alexandrinus (A), and therefore does not correspond at every point to the LXX that Paul and the apostles had. 

As covenant theologians we critique dispensationalists for not following the apostolic hermeneutic. Dispensationalists say that the apostles did things with the OT that we are not authorized to do. We rightly respond that submission to the apostles’ doctrine (Acts 2:42) also implies submission to the apostles’ hermeneutic, which, after all, was a hermeneutic they learned at the feet of Jesus himself. So submission to the apostles’ hermeneutic means submission to the lordship of Christ. Now, can we turn right around and say, with regard to textual criticism as it relates to biblical theology, we will try to make the connections between the OT and the NT using the Masoretic text which the apostles neither knew nor approved? The apostles quote consistently from the LXX. Even where their quotations differ from B, S, and/or A (i.e., Rahlfs), it is very unlikely that they were making their own translations into Greek from a Hebrew manuscript. More than likely they were using some version of the Greek Bible available to them. The discipline of biblical theology must be grounded not only in the apostles’ hermeneutic but also in the apostles’ text. 

Yes, of course, there are times when the LXX translators seem to misunderstand the Hebrew, and the Hebrew brings us closer to the mind of God. Yes, of course, the Hebrew is what was inspired by God, not the Greek translation. But we cannot even begin to sift through these issues if we begin by assuming the hegemony of the Masoretic text which was under the control of Jewish rabbis that rejected the church’s claims about Jesus. We must be open to using the LXX (and even the NT when it quotes the OT) to provide text-critical input into the OT as received and used by the writers of the NT.

Here.

Here’s my note on 1 Timothy 2:12:  Meaning of αὐθεντέω (hapax in NT and rare elsewhere) is hotly debated:  could be (1) negative, “to assume a stance of independent authority, give orders to, dictate to” (BDAG), “to usurp authority” (KJV); or (2) neutral, “to have/exercise authority over” (NASB, ESV, NIV). See Leland E. Wilshire, NTS 34 (1988): 120-34; and H. Scott Baldwin’s word study in Women in the Church: A Fresh Analysis of 1 Timothy 2:9-15 (ed. Köstenberger, et al.; Baker, 1995). 

I don’t say so in the notes, but I’m convinced that αὐθεντέω has a negative meaning here. This seems to be the general consensus of scholars. Note BDAG’s extended definition. See also the summary by John Jefferson Davis (without endorsing either his interpretation of 1 Tim 2:12-14 as targeting a specific problem in Ephesus, or his call to open the office of pastor/teacher to women). Even H. Scott Baldwin, who wants to argue for a neutral meaning in 1 Tim 2:12, cites plenty of evidence supporting a negative connotation. If Paul had intended a neutral meaning, why did he choose this word which occurs only here in the NT and is rare outside the NT? Why didn’t he pick a more common word such as προΐστημι which Paul uses six times in reference to church office/leadership (1 Tim 3:4, 5, 12; 1 Tim 5:17; 1 Thess 5:12; Rom 12:8)? 

Of course, the prohibition against women teaching remains. I’m not advocating an egalitarian position with regard to ordination to the office of pastor/teacher. But I do think it is important to face exegetical facts, even if they do not fit conveniently into our preconceptions. The practical rub:  if the word is negative rather than neutral, then 1 Tim 2:12 does not prohibit women from serving in non-teaching ordained roles in the church, e.g., the office of deacon. A deacon ought not to be assuming a stance of independent authority over anybody, but merely providing servant-leadership in the church in conjunction with other deacons and in submission to the session.