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Central to Kline’s interpretation of Col 2:11 is the exegetical decision to take “of Christ” in the phrase “the circumcision of Christ” as an objective genitive. On this reading, “the circumcision of Christ” is the circumcision that Christ received, not when he was eight days old, but when he was crucified. The context of Paul’s argument makes clear that believers participate in Christ’s circumcision-death by faith (as symbolized in baptism), so that in union with Christ we are also reckoned as having been circumcised or cut off under the wrath of God. Of course, this participation in the circumcision of Christ is not an end in itself but a means of salvation. Because of union with Christ, we are not only judged but also raised with Christ, with the result that salvation comes through judgment.

I find Kline’s objective genitive interpretation theologically attractive. But perhaps for that very reason I also worry whether it is objectively viable on exegetical grounds. So the thought occurred to me to check the views of the major commentators on Colossians — most of whom have presumably never heard of Kline. To my surprise the objective genitive is adopted by a number of highly regarded NT scholars.  This is not an exhaustive review of all commentaries on Colossians, but I think I’ve checked the main scholarly ones.

(1) Commentators who adopt the objective genitive

Markus Barth and Helmut Blanke, Colossians: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary (AB 34B; New York: Doubleday, 1994), 318-20, 363-69:

It is more probable that v 11 alludes to the death of Jesus. Otherwise the subsequent words concerning his burial and resurrection would stand curiously without a reference point … The phrase “body of the flesh” is also best interpreted as in 1:22 … to define the earthly/human existence of Jesus, where the entire expression “in the laying down of the body of the flesh” is the description of his death … If this interpretation is correct, then the expression used in v 11, “circumcision of Christ,” becomes clear. It cannot be a designation of baptism, but rather only a description of the death of Jesus.

James D. G. Dunn, The Epistles to the Colossians and to Philemon: A Commentary on the Greek Text (NIGTC; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1996), 157-58:

More likely the phrase [“the stripping off of the body of the flesh”] is an adaptation of the description of physical circumcision – a stripping off of the flesh (of the foreskin) – applied to Jesus’ death in deliberate echo of 1:22 … The final phrase, “in the circumcision of Christ,” is best seen, then, simply as a summary expression of the larger imagery of the preceding phrases. That is, what is in view is not primarily a circumcision effected by Christ … but a concise description of the death of Christ under the metaphor of circumcision. It is clearly implied, of course, from the first phrase, that conversion-initiation could consequently be understood as a sharing in that circumcision, but it is precisely a sharing in his circumcision-death, not an independent act of Christians’ own circumcision-death.

Other commentators who adopt the objective genitive include: 

Ralph P. Martin, Colossians and Philemon (NCB; London: Oliphants, 1974), 82.

C. F. D. Moule, The Epistles of Paul the Apostle to the Colossians and to Philemon (CGTC; Cambridge: CUP, 1957), 94-96.

Peter T. O’Brien, Colossians, Philemon (WBC 44; Waco: Word Books, 1982), 116-17.

(2) Commentators who reject the objective genitive

Although the objective genitive receives strong support, there are also some heavy-weight commentators on the other side who reject this interpretation and argue for one of the following alternatives:

a. Subjective genitive:  “the circumcision of Christ” is the spiritual circumcision that Christ performs in us by cutting off our sinful nature and regenerating us to newness of life: 

Eduard Schweizer, The Letter to the Colossians: A Commentary (trans. Andrew Chester; London: SPCK, 1982), 143.

b. Genitive of quality:  the genitive “of Christ” would be translated “Christian.” Thus, “the circumcision of Christ” is Christian circumcision in contrast with the fleshly circumcision of the old covenant. On this view, “Christian circumcision” could either refer to baptism or regeneration:

Murray J. Harris, Colossians and Philemon (EGGNT; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1991), 102-3. (Harris calls it the adjectival genitive, and sees it as very similar in meaning to the genitive of possession.)

Petr Pokorný, Colossians: A Commentary (trans. Siegfried S. Schatzmann; Peabody, Mass.: Hendrickson, 1991), 124-25.

N. T. Wright, Colossians and Philemon (TNTC; Leicester: InterVarsity, 1986), 105.

At least one commentator rejects the objective genitive without specifying whether he leans to the subjective genitive or the genitive of quality:

Eduard Lohse, Colossians and Philemon (Hermeneia; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1971), 102-3.

Conclusion

It would appear from the above survey that NT scholarship is evenly divided on this issue. Good arguments can be made on both sides. My point is to show the Kline’s interpretation is not idiosyncratic but finds significant support in mainstream biblical scholarship. The objective genitive is exegetically viable on its own terms and may not be dismissed as Kline’s attempt to force the text into his system.

(3) “The Circumcision of Christ” (Col 2:11-12)

The third continuity between BOC and KP is Kline’s marvelous exegesis of Col 2:11-12. Here is the passage, first in the original Greek, then in English translation:

ἐν ᾧ καὶ περιετμήθητε περιτομῇ ἀχειροποιήτῳ ἐν τῇ ἀπεκδύσει τοῦ σώματος τῆς σαρκός, ἐν τῇ περιτομῇ τοῦ Χριστοῦ, συνταφέντες αὐτῷ ἐν τῷ βαπτισμῷ, ἐν ᾧ καὶ συνηγέρθητε διὰ τῆς πίστεως τῆς ἐνεργείας τοῦ θεοῦ τοῦ ἐγείραντος αὐτὸν ἐκ νεκρῶν·

“And in Him you were also circumcised with a circumcision made without hands, in the removal of the body of the flesh by the circumcision of Christ; having been buried with Him in baptism, in which you were also raised up with Him through faith in the working of God, who raised Him from the dead” (NASB).

Here are Kline’s comments on the text:

BOC, pp. 46-47:

In the Colossians 2 passage … Paul affirms the union of the Christian with Christ in his crucifixion-circumcision … That Paul here interprets circumcision as a dying or death is clear from the sequence of ideas: circumcision, burial, resurrection (cf. Rom. 6:3, 4). This is confirmed by the exposition of circumcision as a “putting (or stripping) off,” the latter being in turn synonymous with “putting to death” (Col. 3:5-9). As a death in union with Christ, the representative sin-bearer, in his crucifixion, the Christian’s circumcision-death is an undergoing of the wrath of God against sin, a falling under his sword of judgment. It is a judicial death as the penalty for sin. Yet, to be united with Christ in his death is also to be raised with him whom death could not hold in his resurrection unto justification. So it is that circumcision, which in itself as a symbolic action signifies the sword of the Lord cutting off his false servants, as a sign of the Covenant of Redemption takes on, alongside the import of condemnation, that of justification, the blessing that may come through the curse.

BOC, pp. 70-71:

Thoroughly congenial to the ordeal interpretation of the baptismal symbolism is the New Testament’s exposition of baptism as a participation with Christ in the judgment ordeal of his death, burial, and resurrection (see Rom. 6:3ff.; Col. 2:11ff.; cf. I Cor. 1:13; Lk. 12:50) …

Earlier we followed the exegesis of “the circumcision of Christ” (Col. 2:11) that regards “of Christ” as an objective genitive and “the circumcision,” therefore, as the crucifixion of Christ. “Without hands” would then mean that his circumcision was no mere human symbolization of the curse sanction of the law but the actual divine judgment. “Putting off the body of flesh” would further contrast the crucifixion to the symbolic removal of the foreskin as being a perfecting of circumcision in a complete cutting off unto death, and that as an object of divine cursing … If, then, Paul calls the Christian death-experience a circumcision it is only because he was first of all prepared to call Christ’s death a circumcision.

Kline follows the same interpretation 32 years later:

KP, p. 316:

Circumcision is in fact employed in the Scripture as an image for that redemptive judgment undergone by Christ.  Paul referred to the crucifixion as “the circumcision of Christ” (Col 2:11), seeing it as antitype to the circumcision-sacrifice of Isaac (Gen 22), a “putting off” not merely of a token part but of the whole body of his flesh through death (cf. Col 1:22), a veritable perfecting of circumcision. [See By Oath Consigned, pp. 45-47,71.]

What was signified by circumcision was, therefore, the generic concept of the divine judgment in its twofold potential.  It conveyed the threat of being cut off from God and life for the one who, disclaiming the grace of the covenant and thus breaking it, would undergo in himself the judgment due to Adam’s fallen race.  But circumcision also presented the promise of the Cross, inviting the circumcised to identify by faith with Christ, to undergo the judgment of God in him, and so find in his circumcision-judgment the way to the Father, to justification and life.

Isn’t the gospel great! Too often preachers explain the substitutionary atonement using the analogy of the convicted felon who stands before the judge, but the judge happens to be his father, so the father takes his son’s place that the son can go free. This captures the substitutionary element of the atonement, but it misses the representative dimension. The great thing about the atonement isn’t that I don’t have to die, but that I have died. And since this death was in union with Christ, I have also been delivered from the curse and ushered into resurrection life on the other side. 

So, to summarize Kline’s interpretation of Col 2:11-12:

a. Taking “of Christ”  as an objective genitive, “the circumcision of Christ” (ἡ περιτομὴ τοῦ Χριστοῦ) means that Christ is the object of the divine ”circumcision” action. On the cross, Christ himself was circumcised, cut off, accursed, and judged.

b. The sequence is “circumcision, burial, resurrection.” Normally, the sequence is “death, burial, resurrection.” Therefore, “circumcision” here is equal to ”death.”

c. Baptism, like circumcision, is associated with death or judgment. Both circumcision and baptism, then, are symbolic actions that signify divine judgment.

d. All of this is Christocentric. The divine judgment has been undergone by Christ himself and we in him. Therefore, both circumcision in the Old Covenant and baptism in the New signify redemptive judgment. Blessing comes through curse.

e. It is not enough to speak of Christ’s substitutionary death. It is substitutionary, but it is also representative. He not only died in our place. We also died in forensic union with him! This precious truth is not only found in Col 2:11-12 but in many other passages:

“Our old self was crucified with him” (Rom 6:6; cf. 7:4)

“One died for all, therefore all died” (2 Cor 5:14)

“I have been crucified with Christ” (Gal 2:20; cf. 6:14)

“You have died” (Col 3:3)

To quote Kline again, circumcision/baptism invites us

to identify by faith with Christ, to undergo the judgment of God in him, and so find in this circumcision-judgment the way to the Father, to justification and life.  

f. To say that we have been both judged and raised in (forensic) union with Christ is simply to say that we have been justified. I add the word “forensic” in order to clarify that, with regard to justification, union with Christ is legal. It is simply another way of stating that we are represented by Christ as our federal head and surety. 

g. However, there is also a dimension of union with Christ that goes beyond the legal and includes an element of real participation and mystical transformation. Justification is immediately and inseparably followed by sanctification. We are judged, then raised (justification), and now that we are raised, we walk in newness of life by the power of his Spirit dwelling in us (sanctification). Circumcision and baptism therefore signify both justification and sanctification in union with Christ.

Just in case you’re wondering, Kline agrees that both justification and sanctification are symbolized in these oath signs (KP, pp. 316-17):

Circumcision, properly experienced, means identification with Christ in his crucifixion-circumcision as a satisfaction of divine justice and it thus means safe passage through the death-judgment to the resurrection unto justification (Col 2:11ff.; Rom 4:11).  To be circumcised in Christ involves further a dying to sin, a putting off of the old man not only in the forensic sense but subjectively in the spiritual transformation of sanctification (Col 2:11ff; 3:5ff.).

(2) Baptism as a sign of judgment

Not only is circumcision a symbolic action that signifies the concept of judgment, so is baptism. Specifically, baptism is a judicial ordeal. Kline appeals to the following pieces of evidence in support: 

a. John’s baptism was part of God’s law-suit against Israel. Kline reminds us of John’s warnings of impending judgment (BOC, p. 54):

The voice in the wilderness cried, “Repent ye: for the kingdom of heaven is at hand” (Matt. 3:2). It warned of “the wrath to come” and of the vanity of reliance on external earthly relationships, even descent from Abraham. If the trees did not bring forth satisfactory fruit … then they must be cursed as a cumbrance to the ground and cut off. The axe was even now “laid unto the root” to inflict this judgment of circumcision (cf. Matt. 3:7ff.; Lk. 3:7ff.). One would expect that the baptism of John as the sign of such a mission of ultimatum would portray by its own symbolic form the threatened ordeal of divine judgment … the impending judicial ordeal which would discriminate and separate between the chaff and the wheat.

b. Jesus’ reception of John’s baptism and his use of “baptism” imagery to refer to his death (Mark 10:38; Lk 12:50) reinforce this reading of baptism as a judicial ordeal. Kline writes (BOC, pp. 58-59):

As covenant Servant, Jesus submitted in symbol to the judgment of the God of the covenant in the waters of baptism. But for Jesus, as the Lamb of God, to submit to the symbol of judgment was to offer himself up to the curse of the covenant. By his baptism Jesus was consecrating himself unto his sacrificial death in the judicial ordeal of the cross. Such an understanding of his baptism is reflected in Jesus’ own reference to his coming passion as a baptism: “I have a baptism to be baptized with” (Lk. 12:50; cf. Mk. 10:38).

c. Peter interpreted the flood (1 Pet 3:21) as a type of baptism, and Paul viewed the exodus (1 Cor 10:1-2) as a kind of baptism. Since the flood and the exodus were judicial ordeals, baptism must be a judicial ordeal as well (BOC, pp. 65, 67, 69):

That Peter conceived of Christian baptism as a sign of judicial ordeal is indicated by his likening it to the archetypal water ordeal, the Noahic deluge (I Pet. 3:20-22) … Paul saw the nature of baptism displayed in another classic Old Testament water ordeal … The exodus judgment was then an ordeal by fire-cloud and water, and it was this ordeal that Paul identified as a baptism.

Of course, Kline’s interpretation of both circumcision and baptism as signs of judgment is not intended to be purely negative. The judgment involved is actually ”redemptive judgment.” For it is in union with Christ that we have been circumcised by the sword of divine judgment and baptized in God’s overwhelming flood of wrath. We have been judged in Christ and raised with him to eternal life, i.e., we have been justified. I’ll explore this further in a subsequent post.

In chapters 3-5 of BOC, Kline deals with circumcision and baptism. These chapters form the heart and soul of BOC. It is here that Kline makes his lasting contribution to the theology of circumcision and baptism. Here are the chapter titles:

Chapter 3:  Circumcision:  Oath-Sign of the Old Covenant
Chapter 4:  John’s Baptismal Sign of Judgment
Chapter 5:  Christian Baptism:  Oath-Sign of the New Covenant

In these three chapters, the burden of Kline’s argument is that both circumcision and baptism, as signs of their respective covenants, are sacramental actions that symbolize God’s judgment or curse. This crucial insight is the basis of several points of continuity between BOC and KP, i.e., points that Kline continued to endorse.

(1) Circumcision as a sign of judgment

Kline adduces three exegetical arguments in support of this conclusion. Actually, there is a fourth (Col 2:11-12), but I’ll cover that in a separate post since it’s so important.

a. The circumcision knife is a picture of the sword of divine judgment (Josh 5:13; Rev 19:15). Kline appeals to Joshua 5 which recounts the circumcision of the second generation of Israelites at Gilgal. Soon after the nation is circumcised, Joshua sees an angel, the captain of LORD’s host, standing “with his sword drawn in his hand,” prepared to lead the nation into its first major battle against the Canaanites, the battle of Jericho. Kline comments (BOC, p. 43 n. 11):

It is as if the sword of the captain of the host of the Lord had been turned away from the uncircumcised nation by their cutting the covenant-allegiance oath anew through circumcision, and only then could be directed against the Canaanites to cut them off from the land.

b. The second exegetical argument for interpreting circumcision as a sign of judgment is the use of the verb “cut off” in Gen 17:14. Kline explains (BOC, p. 43):

The meaning of circumcision as symbol of the oath-curse is actually expressed in so many words in verse 14. There the threat of the curse sanction sounds against the one who breaks the covenant by not obeying the command of circumcision:  “(he) shall be cut off” … In the cutting off of the foreskin the judgment of excision from the covenant relationship was symbolized.

c. The third argument is the offering of Isaac (Gen 22). Kline argues that the knife ritual in Gen 22 was a “perfecting” of the circumcision of Gen 17. He writes (BOC, p. 44):

For Abraham the consecratory purpose of circumcision was brought home in another cutting ritual he was afterwards required to perform. When Isaac the son of promise was born, Abraham had circumcised him on the eighth day as God had commanded (Gen. 21:4). But later God summoned Abraham to take up the knife again and to perfect Isaac’s circumcision by cutting him off altogether from among the living (Gen. 22:1ff.). The identification of this cutting off of Isaac as “a burnt offering” (v. 2), the form of sacrifice expressive of total consecration, illuminates the meaning of these knife rituals.

In Kingdom Prologue (2000), Kline refers to By Oath Consigned (1968) seven times. All seven references are favorable, as in “see BOC for more on this topic,” although in one key reference (KP, p. 312, quoted below) Kline makes a brief allusion to the fact that his treatment of the same topic in KP involves “some revision.” All seven references are to the treatment of circumcision and baptism in BOC chs. 3-6. There are no references in KP to BOC chs. 1-2.

Here are the seven references:

KP, p. 217:  Dealing with the Noahic flood and Israel’s crossing of the Red Sea as judicial ordeals and types of the final judgment, Kline writes:  “(cf. the comments on 1 Cor 10:1,2 in my By Oath Consigned, p.68).”

KP, p. 312:  This is the start of a new section titled “Circumcision Oath” (KP, pp. 312-18). Kline writes:  “[On this subject see further my By Oath Consigned (1968), of which the present discussion is a résumé involving some revision.]” What exactly was involved in this “revision” is a topic I’ll address in subsequent posts.

KP, p. 316: Later in this same section, Kline deals with “the circumcision of Christ” (Col 2:11) and adds:  “[See By Oath Consigned, pp. 45-47,71.]”

KP, p. 317:  On the next page, Kline sets out to argue that baptism corresponds to circumcision in its symbolic meaning, and adds:  “(For a more extensive treatment see my By Oath Consigned.)”

KP, p. 361:  This is a later section dealing with the nature of the Abrahamic covenant as a family-based covenant community. “From the beginning the institution of the family was consistently respected in determining the constituency of the covenant family.  (See further on this topic my By Oath Consigned, pp.84ff.)” Page 84 and following coincides with BOC ch. 6 which is Kline’s argument for infant baptism on the ground of parental authority.

KP, p. 363:  Dealing with the theological significance of baptism:  “(cf. By Oath Consigned, pp.63ff.).” Page 63 and following coincides with BOC ch. 5:  “Christian Baptism: Oath-Sign of the New Covenant.”

KP, pp. 363-64:  Again dealing with the topic of household baptism:  “(Cf. By Oath Consigned, pp.96f.  See pp.94ff. for a discussion of the question of the continuation of the broader household approach inclusive of ‘servants.’)”

The take-away from this is that Kline did not totally discourage people from reading BOC. He still thought it contained valuable insights, particularly related to his treatment of circumcision and baptism (BOC chs. 3-5), as well as his argument for infant baptism on the basis of parental authority (BOC ch. 6). However, he would have wanted readers of BOC to also read his treatment of the same themes in KP (pp. 312-18 and 361-65). These sections of KP were a briefer “resume” of BOC, so one would still need to consult BOC for the fuller argument. Nevertheless, the briefer resume did involve “some revision” of BOC at certain points.

His discussion of covenant theology in BOC chs. 1-2 is not addressed anywhere in KP. Kline felt that these chapters required a much greater degree of revision than BOC chs. 3-6.

(5) Folding the covenant of grace into the pactum salutis

In BOC, Kline folds the covenant of grace into the pactum salutis, creating a single covenant that he calls “the covenant of redemption” (BOC, p. 37). This is a logical step that flows from his thesis that all promise covenants are fundamentally law covenants (see Discontinuity 4). If all promise covenants are law covenants at root, then the covenant of grace must ultimately be identical with the pactum salutis, the supreme law covenant which brings about redemptive blessings through Christ’s fulfillment of the law on behalf of the elect. In accordance with his sweeping application of the “priority of law” principle to all covenants, in BOC Kline rejects the “separation” between the pactum salutis and the covenant of grace (BOC, p. 35).

In KP, by contrast, Kline no longer sees law covenant as the generic form for promise covenants. As a result, he is free to argue that the covenant of grace (whether in its pre-Messianic/Abrahamic or Messianic/New Covenant administration) is conceptually distinct from the pactum salutis, even though it is intimately connected to it. In KP, Kline views the covenant of grace as a historical administration in which the benefits secured by Christ in the eternal pactum salutis are offered to all members of the covenant (the visible church) and are applied and sealed to the elect. Although the satisfaction of divine law through the mediatorship of Christ is certainly foundational to the covenant of grace, the covenant of grace itself is not a conditional law covenant that has been fulfilled by Christ. Rather, the covenant of grace is the historical, visible, covenantal instrument by which God administers the blessing secured by Christ under the eternal pactum salutis. These two covenants pertaining to the plan of redemption are “interlocking” and yet “to be clearly distinguished” (see quote below).

Here is how Kline describes the relationship between the pactum salutis (“The Father’s Covenant of Works with the Son”) and the covenant of grace in KP (p. 138):

This second covenant of works is the eternal covenant, which we shall call “The Father’s Covenant of Works with the Son.”  The series of temporal administrations of redemptive grace to God’s people are subsections of what we shall call “The Lord’s Covenant of Grace with the Church” (or, for brevity’s sake we may use the traditional “Covenant of Grace”).  Preeminently the Covenant of Grace finds expression in the new covenant, but it also includes all those earlier covenantal arrangements wherein the benefits secured by the obedience of Christ in fulfillment of God’s eternal covenant with him were in part already bestowed during premessianic times, in each case according to the particular eschatological phase of covenant history.

Though interlocking, these two redemptive covenants, the eternal and the temporal, are nevertheless to be clearly distinguished from each other for they differ in several most basic respects.

In the eternal covenant,
(1) the Son is assigned the role of covenant servant;
(2) the second party is the Son in his status as second Adam and thus, included along with him, the elect whom he represents, and them exclusively; and
(3) the operative principle is works. 

Contrariwise, in the series of historical administrations of the gospel,
(1) the messianic Son is Lord and mediator of the covenant;
(2) the second party is the church, the community of the confessors of the faith and their children, including others beside the elect; and
(3) the operative principle is grace.

For more on this, see Kline’s Comments on the A. A. Hodge One-Covenant Construction of the Redemptive Order. (N.B.: “The one-covenant construction” is Kline’s label for what I have called “the two-covenant view.”) Please do click on this link. It’s brief and it takes the above KP quote and adds some meat to the bones.

There are several advantages to Kline’s mature view: 

First, it enables him to highlight more clearly the contrasting principles of works and grace. The operative principle of the pactum salutis is works, whereas the operative principle of the covenant of grace is grace. The pactum salutis is a covenant of works. It is not the Adamic covenant of works, since that covenant still stands in some sense; though broken by Adam’s fall, its curse sanction is still operative and will be executed upon all who are not in the salvation-ark through faith in Christ. Thus the pactum salutis is a covenant of works, since it demands obedience as the ground of blessing. Christ as the second Adam is the federal representative of the elect, whose meritorious obedience is reckoned to their account as the ground for their reception of the blessings in forensic union with Christ. It is works for Christ, that it might be grace for us.

Second, the covenant of grace is not a covenant of works, with blessings promised for obedience. Rather it is a free offer of the gospel in which all who respond to the offer by extending the empty hand of faith receive the blessings in Christ. This is related to the long-debated question among covenant theologians as to whether the covenant of grace is conditional or unconditional, which in turn is related to the doctrine of justification. Kline would say the covenant of grace is conditional – in the sense that faith is the sole condition of the covenant. Not all who are members of the covenant of grace are elect, and therefore not all have faith. Those in whom the condition is not met — i.e., those who do not have faith — do not receive the blessings offered in the covenant of grace. On the other hand, those who do believe, do receive the blessings. So there is a sort of conditionality here. Yet Kline would also want to clarify the nature of this conditionality. It is not the same sort of conditionality in a covenant of works, in which meeting the condition is the ground of receiving the blessings. Faith is not a meritorious condition but merely the instrument by which we receive the blessings that have been merited by Christ in the pactum salutis. Additionally, faith as the condition of the covenant of grace is itself a gift, one of the chief blessings that Christ has earned for his people in the pactum salutis. How great is that!

Third, the distinction between the covenant of grace and the pactum salutis is relevant to the argument for infant baptism. If the covenant of grace is folded into or equated with the pactum salutis, it is hard to avoid the implication that the covenant of grace is made only with the elect. Many covenant theologians have had difficulty trying to harmonize this with their view that the children of professing believers are also members of the covenant, even though we do not know if they are elect. Typically, the solution has been to distinguish between “internal” and ”external” membership in the covenant of grace. Kline isn’t happy with this solution and argues rather that the membership of the covenant of grace is a larger circle than the circle of election. The membership roster of the covenant of grace is the same as the visible church, which consists of professing believers and their children (at least until they are put out of the visible church due to their unbelief). The pactum salutis, on the other hand, has only the elect in view, since in that covenant Christ is the head, surety, and sponsor of the elect, serving as the federal representative who satisfies the terms of this covenant of works on behalf of his people. In the pactum salutis, not one of those for whom Christ died can be lost. In the covenant of grace, its proper purpose is the salvation of the elect, but in the pre-consummation era it may contain those who are non-elect; and the branches that are not united to Christ by faith will eventually be cut off (John 15:6; Rom 11:17-22).

Obviously, all of this has relevance not only to infant baptism but to the debates surrounding the Federal Vision. I think Kline’s formulations bring tremendous clarity by making important distinctions that the FV tends to obscure.

For a more extensive treatment of Kline’s covenant theology, see Two Adams, Two Covenants of Works (= selections from KP).

(4) Priority of law

In chapter 1 of BOC, Kline argues that the scriptural covenants can be subdivided into “law covenants” and “promise covenants.” However, in chapter 2, he argues that this is not an absolute bifurcation since “promise covenants” are actually “law covenants” at a foundational level, with the only difference being that the law is fulfilled by Christ. He explains this concept by appealing to the vicarious obedience of Christ (BOC, p. 33):

Even the promise alternate was itself ultimately a way of law – not the way of individual obedience to the law which was explicitly enunciated in the Mosaic covenants, but … the way of vicarious law obedience and satisfaction by the Christ of promise.

In other words, “the promise covenant” (what we traditionally refer to as “the covenant of grace”) is ultimately a “law covenant” in which the legal conditions are fulfilled by a Substitute.

This doesn’t seem too bad, does it? It’s congenial with Kline’s later emphasis, in response to the Shepherd Controversy, on the notion that we are justified by works, not our works, of course, but the works of Christ in our place.

Kline never wavered on this fundamental point. In KP he clearly affirms the second Adam’s obedience under the second covenant of works (the pactum salutis). “The principle of works forms the foundation of the gospel of grace” (KP, p. 108). But unlike in BOC, he restricts the application of the “priority of law” principle to the pactum salutis. The discontinuity between BOC and KP at this point is not the principle itself (that law is foundational to grace) but the sweeping application of the principle to all covenants. For example, in BOC he says (BOC, p. 33):

The conclusion may now be stated that a truly systematic formulation of the theology of the covenant will define covenant generically in terms of law administration … The satisfaction of the divine law underlies every administration of divine promise.

But Kline later changed his mind, saying only that “some biblical covenants are of the works variety” (KP, p. 5). Kline no longer thought that every promise covenant is really a law/works covenant with the law/works principle satisfied by Christ. Although the pactum salutis fits this description, the Noahic covenant and the covenant of grace (including its pre-Messianic administration, the Abrahamic Covenant, as well as its Messianic phase, the New Covenant) do not.

I realize that this last comment about the covenant of grace cries out for further explanation. This will become clearer as I work my way through BOC. For now, allow me to quote further from BOC. As long as the above qualification is kept in mind, the following quotes provide a little window into the heartbeat of Kline’s passion for the gospel.

BOC, p. 30:

Was the covenant of law established by God at the beginning (Gen. 1 and 2) made of no effect by the subsequent introduction of the promise (Gen. 3:15)? Was the promise against the law of God? No one should hesitate to answer this question, as Paul did his, with a “God forbid.” For if there were an annulling of the Edenic law covenant after it had been established by God and later broken by man, then the justice of God would be mutable and his threats vain. God remains just when he justifies the ungodly through his administrations of promise. Herein is the depth of his redemptive wisdom revealed, that in the very process of securing for his chosen the covenant’s blessing of life, God honors his original covenant of law in its abiding demand for obedience as the condition of life and with its curse of death for the covenant breakers.

And BOC, p. 31:

Galatians 3:18 must be stressed in Covenant Theology, but so too must Romans 5:18-21. It is by the obedience of the one that the many are made righteous unto eternal life. Though the many inherit the blessings not by law (in the Gal. 3:18 sense) but by promise, they are not heirs at all except they are heirs in and through Christ, joint-heirs with Christ. For the promises of the covenant are yea and amen only in Christ. And therefore the promises are made secure to the many according to the principle of inheritance by law after all. For Christ himself enters upon the inheritance as the forerunner, surety, and head of the many only when by his active and passive obedience he has fulfilled the constant Hauptgebot* of the covenant and submitted to the demand of the curse sanction voiced in the covenant from the beginning. Now if it is the obedience of the one that is the ground of the promise-guarantee given to the many, then clearly the principle of law is more fundamental than that of promise even in a promise covenant.

*Hauptgebot = the principal demand of the ANE treaties, viz., the demand for loyalty to the suzerain. In the Mosaic Covenant, the Hauptgebot is the demand for exclusive monotheistic worship of YHWH (Exod 20:3; Deut 6:5). Christ fulfilled the Hauptgebot by loving his heavenly Father with all of his heart and perfectly devoting his entire being to the performance of his Father’s will, even to the point of submitting to an accursed death (Phil 2:8). This is the obedience of Christ viewed from the active point of view.

I can’t imagine that Kline would be ashamed of the two quotations above. After all these years, and in spite of whatever refinements Kline thought necessary, these powerful quotes continue to resonate with the Pauline gospel of the God who is “both just and the justifier of the one who believes in Jesus” (Rom 3:26).

To summarize:  Does the Kline of KP still affirm the priority of law? With respect to the pactum salutis and its implications for the justification of the elect on the basis of Christ’s fulfillment of the law, yes. But with respect to the covenant of grace proper, he would not want to speak of the priority of law if this means that the covenant of grace itself is actually a law covenant with blessings and curses that have been fulfilled by Christ (as the Kline of BOC ch. 2 implies). Yet, the Kline of KP continues to affirm the priority of law even in connection with the covenant of grace in the sense that the pactum salutis (which is a law covenant) is the foundation of the covenant of grace. In my next post I’ll try to flesh this out a bit more.

(3) Grace before the fall

I mentioned in my introductory post that Kline changed his mind about the notion of grace before the fall. In BOC (p. 36), he writes:

Grace, in the specific sense that it effects restoration to the forfeited blessing of God, is of course found only in redemptive revelation. But in another sense grace is present in the pre-redemptive covenant. For the offer of a consummation of man’s original beatitude, or rather the entire glory and honor with which God crowned man from the beginning, was a display of the graciousness and goodness of God to this claimless creature of the dust.

But in KP (p. 113), Kline defines “grace” more narrowly as God’s mercy shown to those who deserve wrath. On this definition, pre-fall “grace” would be an oxymoron:

Theologically it is of the greatest importance to recognize that the idea of demerit is an essential element in the definition of grace … It is a granting of blessing, as an act of mercy, in spite of previous covenant breaking by which man has forfeited all claims to participation in the kingdom and has incurred God’s disfavor and righteous wrath. 

He goes on to distinguish “grace” from the “love” or “beneficence” that God displayed in the act of creation (KP, p. 113):

Because grace cannot be defined apart from this context of covenantal stipulations and sanctions and is specifically a response of mercy to demerit, it must be carefully distinguished from divine love or beneficence.  For God’s love, though it may find expression in gospel grace, is also expressed in the bestowal of good apart altogether from considerations of the merits of man’s response to covenantal responsibility.  Such is the goodness or benevolence of God displayed in the act of creation.  This marvelous manifestation of love seen in God’s creational endowment of man with glory and honor had nothing to do with human merit. 

For Kline’s mature thinking on the covenant of works, read Answering Objections to the Covenant of Works (= KP, pp. 107-17).

We’ve looked at the continuities between BOC chs. 1-2 and KP. Now I want to take a look at the discontinuities, that is, the areas where Kline revised his covenantal views. BOC was published in 1968; the final edition of KP was published by Two Age Press in 2000, so it shouldn’t be surprising that his views underwent development over 32 years of teaching. Since the discontinuities between BOC chs. 1-2 and KP are not minor, it will take me several posts to get through them.

(1) Terminology

I begin with the most obvious difference between BOC and KP — the use of different terminology for the main theological covenants. In BOC Kline expresses his dissatisfaction with the traditional terms “the covenant of works” and “the covenant of grace,” and proposes that we refer to them instead as “the covenant of creation” and “the covenant of redemption” (BOC, pp. 32, 36).

In KP, Kline returns to the traditional labels. Again, I think the Shepherd Controversy may have played a role in this. He wanted to emphasize the concept of works in the pre-fall covenant in order to bring out the parallel with Christ as the second Adam whose obedience unto death (the works the Father gave him to do) won the Father’s approval and merited eternal life for his people.

(2) Two or three covenants?

Kline’s return in KP to the traditional labels “the covenant of works” and “the covenant of grace” isn’t merely terminological. It also reflects a conceptual shift. In BOC, Kline conceives of “the covenant of redemption” as a covenant that includes both the eternal, intratrinitarian pactum salutis and the historical covenant of grace from the fall onward. This is the two-covenant view (covenant of works and covenant of grace). In KP, Kline abandons this approach and adopts the three-covenant scheme (covenant of works, pactum salutis, and covenant of grace) in which the covenant of grace is distinguished from the pre-temporal pactum salutis.

Covenant theologians have long debated among themselves whether there are two or three covenants, that is, whether the pactum salutis should be separated from the covenant of grace. So Kline’s early adoption of the two-covenant view, followed by his moving to the three-covenant view in his mature thought, should not be viewed as a major innovation. Both views can be documented in the Reformed tradition.

Although Kline returns in KP to the traditional labels for two of these covenants, he comes up with a new name for the pactum salutis and adds some additional terms to the names of the other two covenants. In this sense, Kline does bring some innovation to the table, but it is more in the area of clarifying the received covenant system in order to highlight the inter-relationships among the covenants. Here are his preferred names for the three main theological covenants:

The Creator’s Covenant of Works with Adam (KP, pp. 62, 73)
The Father’s Covenant of Works with the Second Adam (aka the pactum salutis) (KP, p. 138)
The Lord’s Covenant of Grace with the Church (KP, p. 138)

See the handout Kline’s Covenant Theology for a schematic presentation of these three covenants based on his lectures at Westminster Seminary California ca. 1995.

Since this is such an important issue, I’ll return to it in a future post, focusing specifically on the relationship between the pactum salutis and the covenant of grace.

As I mentioned in my introductory post, the first two chapters of By Oath Consigned (BOC) are often thought to provide a concise introduction to Kline’s covenant theology. Understandably, one would rather read 26 pages of relatively normal prose than labor through 406 pages of hyphenated neologisms in Kingdom Prologue (KP)! Believe me, I can sympathize. Nevertheless, it would be a big mistake to think the first two chapters of BOC are a convenient Cliff’s Notes version of KP. The reader of BOC — and I don’t want to discourage people from reading it — needs to be aware that Kline revised his formulation of covenant theology at certain key points.

However, this is not to say that Kline would later disown everything he wrote there. Perhaps I misleadingly gave that impression in my introductory post. So before I get into the areas where Kline would have wanted to revise BOC, I think it would be good to point out the areas where he continued to agree with his earlier formulations. Here is a non-exhaustive list of some of the main continuities between BOC and KP:

(1) Definition of covenant

In BOC (p. 16) Kline defines covenant as

A sanction-sealed commitment to maintain a particular relationship … a relationship under sanctions … characteristically expressed by an oath sworn in the solemnities of covenant ratification.

This is consistent with the more succinct definition he would later give: “oath-bound” or “divinely sanctioned commitment” (KP, pp. 2, 4).

(2) God’s Lordship

In both BOC and KP, Kline appeals to the Ancient Near Eastern suzerainty treaties and uses them as a theological prism for interpreting the biblical covenants as administrative instruments by which God expresses his lordship or kingly rule. Here’s how he puts it in BOC (p. 36):

God’s covenant with man may be defined as an administration of God’s lordship, consecrating a people to himself under the sanctions of divine law. In more general terms, it is a sovereign administration of the kingdom of God … It is God’s lordship that is the core and constant of the covenant.

Similarly, the very title (Kingdom Prologue) and subtitle (Genesis Foundations for a Covenantal Worldview) of KP convey the intimate connection between kingdom and covenant (KP, pp. 1, 4),

for to follow the course of the kingdom is to trace the series of covenants by which the Lord administers his kingdom … Covenants function as administrative instruments of God’s kingly rule.

(3) Critique of Murray

Kline’s primary concern in chapters 1-2 of BOC is that the covenant concept must be defined comprehensively enough to include both law covenants (like the Mosaic) and promise covenants (like the Abrahamic). Although he only mentions John Murray in two brief footnotes (BOC, p. 15 n. 5; p. 18 n. 10), it’s important to recognize that Kline has Murray’s definition of covenant in his sights. In his 1954 booklet, The Covenant of Grace, Murray defined covenant as

a sovereign administration of grace and promise.

Kline thinks this is reductionistic since it fails to recognize that some covenants are not sovereign administrations of grace but conditional covenants with blessings promised for obedience and curses threatened for unfaithfulness. This is a fundamental concern that remains unchanged in Kline’s thought. Cf. his complaint against “improper restriction” of the covenant concept in KP (p. 5).

(4) Two types of covenants

In BOC Kline distinguishes between “promise covenants” and “law covenants” (BOC, p. 16). The classic example of a “promise covenant” is Gen 15 where God takes a self-maledictory oath thereby guaranteeing the bestowment of the promised blessings (BOC, pp. 16-17). The classic example of a “law covenant” is Exod 24 where the oath is sworn by the people of Israel, thus proving that it

cannot be defined in terms of a unilateral promissory commitment from the divine side.

(BOC, p. 18). Kline makes the same distinction in KP, although he uses more traditional terminology, substituting “covenants of works/grace” for “law/promise covenants” (KP, p. 5).

In both BOC and KP, Kline lays down the helpful rule of thumb that the party taking the ratification oath determines which type of covenant it is. Here’s how Kline explains the rule of thumb in BOC (p. 16):

It is this swearing of the ratificatory oath that provides an identification mark by which we can readily distinguish the divine covenants of Scripture between a law covenant and one of promise. For it is evident that if God swears the oath of the ratification ceremony, that particular covenantal transaction is one of promise, whereas if man is summoned to swear the oath, the particular covenant thus ratified is one of law.

In KP (p. 5) Kline takes the same general approach although he adds a bit more precision:

In postlapsarian history, where we encounter covenants both of works and grace, the identity of the party who takes the ratification oath is an indicator of which kind of covenant it is in a particular case … More precisely, in the situation after the Fall it is the presence or absence of a human oath of ratification that provides the clue as to the governing principle … If the covenant is ratified by divine oath alone, it is a covenant of grace … But when the covenant-making includes a human oath of ratification, as in the case of Israel’s oath in the Sinaitic Covenant (Exod 24), the arrangement is informed by the works principle.

Here we have what engineers call a “toggle”:  either humans take the oath, or God alone takes the oath. If humans do not take the oath, but only God, it is a covenant of grace. If humans take the oath, whether or not God does as well, it is a covenant based on the works principle. 

For more on the above four points, see “What is a Covenant?” (= KP, pp. 1-6). It’s a short read and I highly recommend it as an entry point into Kline’s covenant theology.